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THE CONFUSION DEFINED:
QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS OF
PROCESS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE CLINTON
IMPEACHMENT
INTRODUCTION
Following a bitterly divisive thirteen-month debate, President
William Jefferson Clinton was acquitted of two articles of impeach-
ment on February 12, 1999. Senators rejoiced in self-congratulation
as this year-long national embarrassment finally reached its inevitable
conclusion. Yet, it was particularly unnerving that while nearly every
senator and representative called these the most important votes of
their careers, in debate they were often talking past each other, ap-
plying very different standards, and speaking of the basic purpose and
functioning of the impeachment process in markedly different terms.1
Often it seemed that they could have been speaking of different na-
tions with different constitutions and different histories of interpreta-
tion. In the aftermath of this debacle, one is left to ponder the im-
peachment process and whether this antiquated piece of constitutional
machinery needs to be reworked.
The Founders intended for the impeachment language in the Con-
stitution to have some open texture, for reasons that are described in
this Comment. But, because its legitimacy derives from just process,
there are several aspects of the impeachment mechanism that are fun-
damentally weakened by allowing this unsettling variance in inter-
pretation. Some of these questions that remain could not have been
1 See infra note 158. Similarly, Professor Michael Gerhardt, in his thorough treatise on im-
peachment declares without the slightest concern that the "Constitution does not dictate what
each senator must have in his mind when voting on removal; it mandates only that at least two-
thirds of the members present must vote . . . to convict in order for a removal to occur."
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS 44 (1996) [hereinafter
GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS].
2 Another complicating factor in the interpretation of the federal impeachment power de-
rives from the Supreme Court's ruling in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), that any
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intentionally left open by the Founders. For instance, are impeach-
able offenses defined in the Constitution? Is there language that de-
fines a different standard for judges? Is the president held to a higher
or lower standard than other impeachable officials? Does conviction
mandate removal? What range of punishments is available? Does
guilt of "high crimes and misdemeanors" mandate removal? What
due process and standard of proof are constitutionally required in or-
der to convict?
These questions need to be clarified by Congress before this mat-
ter reappears. There is great danger in allowing disagreement on
these aspects that comprise the fundament of the impeachment proc-
ess. Further, it is bad policy to allow the process to be shaped and
defined during the great passion and division of a trial. What was
apparent in the Clinton impeachment, by the strict partisanship of the
votes and arguments given by each side, is that politics guides con-
stitutional interpretation in these matters. Congress needs to reex-
amine and redefine our impeachment process outside of the trial con-
text, where the nature of the process can be coolly deliberated. The
words of the debate can replace the vagaries of the Constitutional
Convention and past English and American precedent.
If Congress does not take such action, we will be leaving ourselves
exposed to the possibility of a true constitutional crisis. A situation
could easily arise when a substantial disagreement in process or stan-
dard results in the constitutionality and, therefore, the legitimacy of
an impeachment, being disputed by senators, pundits, and perhaps
even a president who refuses to leave office. This Comment attempts
to outline the current areas of disputed interpretation and explain
which areas need to be redefined in order to allow discretion where
prudent but to eliminate it where it is not.
Part I of this Comment analyzes the dispute over the scope of im-
peachment, focusing on the meaning of the phrase "high crimes and
misdemeanors" and whether it in fact defines the full range of im-
peachable offenses. Part HI discusses whether the same standard of
required behavior applies to all impeachable offenses. Part m ana-
lyzes the question of whether guilt of "high crimes and misdemean-
ors" mandates removal. Part IV discusses the range of permissible
punishments for the impeached. Part V examines whether there is a
constitutionally required standard of proof and due process for im-
peachment trials. Part VI concludes with a discussion of the danger
inherent in leaving certain aspects of the process open to widely
varying interpretation, and describes some areas that are better left
with open texture and subject to each senator's individual discretion.
claims regarding the procedural propriety of impeachment trials were nonjusticiable. See id. at
235-39.
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I. THE SCOPE OF IMPEACHMENT
Much of the substance of the Clinton impeachment debate re-
volved around the proper scope of impeachment and, specifically,
what constitutes impeachable offenses. There are two very different
readings of the Constitution in this regard. The first maintains that a
president can only be impeached upon conviction for "high crimes
and misdemeanors." There is a significant split within this camp
about what constitutes a "high crime and misdemeanor," which will
be discussed infra. The second reading, which was put forth by Pro-
fessor Isenbergh of the University of Chicago,3 maintains that the
Constitution requires removal for high crimes and misdemeanors but
allows impeachment for a wide variety of offenses.
A. A President Can Only Be Impeached for High Crimes and
Misdemeanors
Even if one accepts the conventional reading of the Constitution,
that a president can only be impeached upon conviction of "high
crimes and misdemeanors," there is still considerable dispute regard-
ing exactly what sort of offense constitutes a high crime or misde-
meanor.4 The Framers' debates were quite brief and less than precise
in this regard, and commentators and senators appear to be able to
string together enough fragmentary quotes from the debates and sub-
sequent analysis to give credibility to almost any position.5 Two
mainstream views have surfaced, however, which are referred to as
the "narrow" reading and the "broad" reading of high crimes and
misdemeanors.
3 See Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process
(last modified Dec. 31, 1998) <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Publications>.
4 See generally, Philip Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some
Notes from History, 36 U. Ci. L. REv. 665, 668 (1969) (commenting that "when it comes to
defining 'high crimes and misdemeanors' no one should claim certainty"); see also RAOUL
BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 5 (1973) [hereinafter BERGER,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS]; Raoul Berger, Impeachment for "High Crimes and Misdemean-
ors," 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 395 (1971) [hereinafter Berger, High Crimes]; Michael J. Gerhardt,
The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1989)
[hereinafter Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits]; Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitu-
tional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. LJ. 707,716 (1987).
5 See Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits, supra note 4, at 4-6. Gerhardt notes that the scholar-
ship on impeachment tends to be "unenlightening and unimpressive," owing in part to the fact
that the impeachment clauses defy systematic analysis because the process is so political by
nature. Id. at 5. Commentators, he argues, appear to let their political biases lead them to what-
ever interpretation of convenience they choose, and there is enough ambiguity in the Framers'
debates to justify their wide range of conclusions. See id. at 7; see also BERGER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 4, at 5 (defending the narrow reading of high crimes and
misdemeanors through historical analysis); Rotunda, supra note 4, at 721-28 (arguing that im-
peachable offenses have no legal limits but should be limited to "serious" offenses).
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1. The Narrow Reading of High Crimes and Misdemeanors
The narrow reading of "high crimes and misdemeanors" appears
to be the most common among legal scholars and senators.6 Their
view is essentially that the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors"
was incorporated in order to set a very high bar for the Senate to have
to hurdle in order to impeach a president.7 Their position is based
more in advocacy of protecting the raw structural power of the ex-
ecutive branch rather than preserving the integrity, dignity, or moral
authority of the Office of the Presidency. In his remarks before the
Senate, White House Counsel Charles Ruff described the "narrow"
reading and the high standard it requires as
a standard that the framers intentionally set at this extraordi-
narily high level to ensure that only the most serious offenses
and in particular those that subverted our system of govern-
ment would justify overturning a popular election. Impeach-
ment is not a remedy for private wrongs. It is a method of
removing someone whose continued presence in office would
cause grave danger to the Nation.8
Similarly, following his vote to acquit Mr. Clinton, Senator Kent
Conrad of North Dakota explained that impeachment requires "great
and public offenses" that directly serve to "bring our commonwealth
into danger."
9
There is ample support for such a reading in the debates of the
Framers and the structure of the Constitution. A number of delegates
to the Constitutional Convention opposed the notion of vesting an
impeachment power in the legislature in any form.10 Others sup-
ported the notion of impeachment only for situations in which "great
crimes were committed" against the state, or to guard against "tyr-
anny and oppression.""
6 This is based on the author's own observations of opinion in the popular media as well as
the scholarship that continues to develop in this hot area of late. Also, over 400 historians and
legal scholars signed a letter that supported the narrow reading with respect to the Clinton im-
peachment. Among those to sign the letter included Arthur M. Schlesinger, Stephen Ambrose
and C. Vann Woodward. See 145 Cong. Rec. S486 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of
White House Counsel Charles Ruff).
7 See BERGER, CONSTIrUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 4, at 61.
8 145 CONG. REC. S486 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of White House Counsel Char-
les Ruff).
9 Senators Offer Some Reasons for Their Decisions in Clinton's Trial, THE N.Y. TIMES ON
TmE WEB, at 4 (Feb. 13, 1999) <http:llwww.nytimes.conllibrary/politicsl021399impeach-
text.html>.
'0 See Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and Cover-Up Under Oath: Impeachable
Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 259, 263 (1998) (explaining that a number of delegates believed that
such a power would interfere with the independence of the executive branch and that the elec-
tors could remove an unfit magistrate upon the expiration of his term of office).
" Id. at 264, 265.
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Further, support for the narrow reading can arguably be found in
the structure of the Constitution as well.' The numerous references
to crime and punishment in the Constitution are argued to represent
an attempt to limit the bases for impeachment to criminal conduct
and, thus, prevent the misuse of power.
13
Proponents of the narrow reading tend to restrict their examination
to the objective elements of a crime. Their focus is on whether a
crime was directed against the state, or an attempt to subvert the Con-
stitution, or a "great" or "serious" offense. For instance, Raoul
Berger explains that the critical element in distinguishing an offense
as a "high crime" is the presence of an injury to the state. 14 His un-
derstanding of impeachable offenses does not include any private
misconduct outside of office, and draws a distinction between a lower
standard for impeachment of lesser officials and a higher bar for im-
peaching a president. 5 The narrow reading appears to place little or
no weight on the subjective elements of an offense, including how the
offense reflects upon the qualities of the executive, or tends to prove a
degree of recklessness, negligence, or disrespect for the law as to
make him unfit to continue in office. 16  A fair assessment of the
Clinton impeachment and subsequent acquittal is that the narrow
reading of high crimes and misdemeanors was endorsed, but given the
totality of its uniquely bizarre circumstances one should expect that
this reading will not be given a tremendous amount of deference in
any subsequent impeachment process.
2. The Broad Reading of High Crimes and Misdemeanors
Those subscribing to the broad reading of "high crimes and mis-
demeanors" tend to focus less on the need for strict separation of
powers and more on the necessity of preserving the integrity of the
Office of the Presidency, the government itself and the sanctity of the
rule of law.17 Their focus is on their belief that impeachment is a de-
cidedly political process, entrusted to the legislative branch without
12 See, e.g., IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIAL AND ERRORS 3-23 (1972) (defending the
narrow reading of high crimes and misdemeanors by examining the structure of the Constitution
and its numerous references to crime and punishment).
"3 See id. at 18-23.
14 See BERGER, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 4, at 61.
IS See id. at 88-93, 196-97.
16 This was essentially the position taken by those driving the impeachment proceedings
against Mr. Clinton. Their argument was that lying under oath, obstruction of justice, and wit-
ness tampering by Mr. Clinton were charges that, despite being committed in his personal ca-
pacity, rather than as the President qua President, showed contempt for the rule of law and were
incompatible with his continuation as President. See 145 CONG. REC. S285 (daily ed. Jan. 16,
1999) (statement of House Manager Buyer); 145 Cong. Rec. S292 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999)
(statement of House Manager Canady).
17 See, e.g., GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 106-07.
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any external check or balance, and not subject to judicial review.18 Its
purpose, they maintain, is to function more as a cleansing process in
order to maintain civic hygiene, rather than provide a power of last
resort, available only when the nation faces "grave danger" from a
corrupt magistrate. 19
Prior to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, im-
peachment was considered to be a political proceeding, and impeach-
able offenses were political crimes. 0 For an offense to be considered
a "high crime," it had to cause an injury to the state.21 The inclusion
of this phrase by the Framers was one of careful and considered de-
liberation, and it was intended to expand the scope of impeachable
conduct to political offenses that cause injury to the state "in its po-
litical character" and tarnish the integrity of the office by "breaching
the public's trust.
22
The scope of offenses that can be properly considered "political
crimes" or "breaches of the public trust" is not easily determined.
While involved in the impeachment proceedings against Supreme
Court Justice William 0. Douglas, then House Majority Leader Ger-
ald R. Ford argued that an impeachable offense "is whatever a major-
ity of the House [considers it] to be at a given moment in history;
conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the
other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of
the accused from office. '23 Many commentators have criticized
Ford's statement on the grounds that it completely ignores the role of
history, precedent, and the text of the Constitution and instead relies
solely on political motivations and resolutions.24 However, Professor
Michael Gerhardt has explained that Ford's statement may actually
capture the practical reality of the impeachment process more accu-
rately than his critics' allegedly impartial analyses suggest. 25 Despite
the fact that it maintains the trappings of a legal proceeding, the im-
18 See id
19 See 145 CONG. REC. S295 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999) (statement of House Manager Ca-
nady).
20 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 103.
2, For instance, Raoul Berger determined that the English defined "high crimes and misde-
meanors" as a category of political crimes against the state. Berger included quotations from
relevant periods where the terms "political" and "against the state" were used interchangeably in
identifying the relevant characteristics of an impeachable offense. See BERGER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 4, at 263-64.
22 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 26 (Comm. Print 1974). The focus of the Committee Report
was to establish that impeachment could be based on nonindictable conduct.
23 116 CONG. REc. 11,913 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1973) (statement of Rep. Ford).
24 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 103 n.2 (citing arti-
cles that criticize Ford's statement by analyzing failed attempts at impeachment that were politi-
cally motivated).
25 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1 at 103; Gerhardt, Con-
stitutional Limits, supra note 4, at 82.
[Vol.49:869
CLINTON IMPEACHMENT
peachment process is designed to deal with political offenses through
political mechanisms. Ford's statement resulted in a number of at-
tempts to circumscribe the ambit of impeachable offenses in order to
limit the influence of politics in beginning or carrying on an im-
peachment.26 Yet, the process remains as designed by the founders,
because the role of political factors is so central to the essence of the
mechanism that it can not and should not be reduced without chang-
ing the utility and purpose behind the process.
The understanding that impeachment was a political proceeding
warranted by offenses that were political in nature was argued and
adopted by both the ratifiers of and the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention.27 The delegates drew on centuries of practice in England
where, as in colonial America, the impeachment process was primar-
ily a political one.28 For instance, Professor Michael Gerhardt ex-
plains that in the state ratification conventions, the delegates fre-
quently explained that impeachment should be used as a remedy
where an official "'deviates from his dut'" or if he "'dare[s] to abuse
the power vested in him by the people.'
''29
Gerhardt continues that a similar understanding was included in
The Federalist by Alexander Hamilton, who wrote that impeachable
offenses were those "which proceed from the misconduct of public
men, or, in other words, from the abuse of some public trust. They
are of a nature which may with particular propriety be denominated
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to
the society itself."30 James Madison concurred in this understanding,
stating that impeachment was "indispensable" to protect the state
from the "incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief Magistrate."'"
Madison's choice of the word "negligence" especially does not seem
to comport with the narrow understanding of high crimes and misde-
meanors.
Further, Justices James Wilson and Joseph Story appear to express
similar views to Hamilton and Madison in their writings. 32  Story
wrote:
[t]he jurisdiction is to be exercised over offences, which are
committed by public men in violation of their public trust and
duties. Those duties are, in many cases, political ....
2See Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits, supra note 4, at 82.
27 See id. at 84 (citing Arthur Bestor, Impeachment, Book Review, 49 WASH. L. REV. 255,
266 (1973) (reviewing RAouL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
(1973)).
28 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 104.
2 9 Id. at 105 (quoting 2 THE DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 47 (J. Elliot ed., 1836)).
30THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).3 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 66 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).32 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 105.
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Strictly speaking, then, the power partakes of a political char-
acter, as it respects injuries to society in its political charac-
ter.
33
Story also viewed the penalties of removal and disqualification as
more of a cleansing process, or civic hygiene. 34 Impeachment is not a
criminal trial; imprisonment or fines can not result from conviction by
the Senate, as sanctions may not extend beyond removal and disquali-
fication. Story stated that this limiting of the range of "punishment to
such modes of redress, as are peculiarly fit for a political tribunal to
administer," would serve to "secure the public against political inju-
ries. 35
This analysis imputes a very different purpose behind impeach-
ment. It describes a mechanism whereby the Congress, for good
cause, can remove a president who has proven himself dangerous,
reckless, unfit or incapacitated to hold the most powerful office in the
federal government. Impeachment, according to the broad reading
proponents, is a mechanism of civic hygiene, whereby an unfit ex-
ecutive whose actions damage the integrity and worth of our highest
office shall be removed.
The House Judiciary Committee examined the history of Ameri-
can federal impeachment proceedings in 1974.36 A report defining
three broad categories of impeachable offenses emerged. The first
involved exceeding or abusing the constitutional limits on the powers
of the office in derogation of the powers of another branch of gov-
ernment. 37 The second focused on behavior that is grossly incom-
patible with the proper function and purpose of the office.38 The third
included using the power of the office for an improper purpose or for
personal gain.39 The breadth of these categories is telling in terms of
the difficulty in defining a range of impeachable offenses. As dis-
cussed above, "high crimes and misdemeanors" are not limited to in-
dictable crimes, but it is in defining the nonindictable or purely politi-
cal offenses that one encounters serious difficulty.
Justice Story believed, similarly to Hamilton, that "political of-
fenses are of so various and complex a character, so utterly incapable
of being defined or classified, that the task of positive legislation
33 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 385, at
272-73 (Ronald Rotunda & John Nowak eds., 1987).
34 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 87 (arguing that a
president "may be impeached and removed for lacking the minimal level of integrity and judg-
ment sufficient to discharge the responsibilities of the office").
35 STORY, supra note 33, at § 385 at 272-73.36 HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 26 (Comm. Print 1974).
37 See id.
38 See id.
39 See id.
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would be impracticable, if it were not almost absurd to attempt it."
Thus, Story believed that impeachable offenses would have to be de-
fined on an ad hoc basis.41 The conventional wisdom that has devel-
oped from a meager and often confusing body of precedent, question-
able legal scholarship, and conclusions drawn from the apocryphal
debates of the Framers is that not all impeachable offenses are crimes,
and not all crimes are political offenses.
In determining which offenses are impeachable, and why they are
so, the broad reading proponents examine the true purpose behind the
impeachment clause. Professor Gerhardt argues that violations of
some criminal statutes might be considered abuses against the state
sufficient to trigger the impeachment process if the "offenses in-
volved demonstrate serious lack of judgment or disdain for the law
and their commission lowers respect for the office.' 43 That is, if
Congress considers an alleged crime to reflect an egregious lack of
judgment, breach of the public trust, and disreard for the integrity of
the office, that offense would be impeachable. It is clear that not all
crimes would warrant impeachment; jaywalking or speeding are ex-
amples of technical violations of statutes that contain neither the
gravity of a high crime against the state nor would they show such a
lack of judgement as to warrant removal from office.45 The full range
of political crimes defies specification because both their gravity and
their reflection on the fitness of the perpetrator are determined by the
totality of the circumstances of the act, the political reality of the
moment and the political judgement of the Congress 46
The well respected report on the "Law of Presidential Impeach-
ment," prepared by the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York in 1974, summarized the proper range of offenses that warrant
impeachment and removal. 47 It explained that the grounds for re-
moval were not limited to crimes, but extended to
acts which undermine the integrity of the office .... In our
view, the essential nexus to damaging the integrity of gov-
ernment may be found in acts which constitute corruption in,
or flagrant abuse of the powers of, official position. It may
40 STORY, supra note 33, § 405, at 288.
41 See id.
42 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 104 (explaining that
"the debates at the constitutional convention show at least that impeachable offenses were not
limited to indictable offenses .... On the other hand, not all statutory crimes demonstrate unfit-
ness for office").43 GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 106.44 See iL
45 See id.
4 See id.
47 See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT 18-19 (1974).
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also be found in acts which, without directly affecting gov-
ernmental processes, undermine the degree of public confi-
dence in the probity of executive and judicial officers that is
essential to the effectiveness of government in a free soci-
ety.4
8
For both the narrow and broad reading, a problem exists regarding
how to include serious private misdeeds into the category of high
crimes and misdemeanors. Consider, for instance, this reasonable but
strained logic from Professor Gerhardt:
Yet, it is easy to imagine that a president who murdered
someone in a jealous rage committed an impeachable offense
[and hence, a high crime according to Gerhardt]. Even if
such a crime were unrelated to the president's constitutional
duties, his criminal act cheapens the presidency, destroys his
credibility with the other branches (and other nations, for that
matter), and shows such a lack of respect for human life and
disdain for the law (which he is sworn to enforce faithfully)
that Congress could conclude that he had seriously abused his
trust and no longer deserved to hold office.
49
There is very little doubt that Professor Gerhardt's ultimate con-
clusion is correct; murder is an impeachable offense. Yet, when ana-
lyzing his argument in light of the traditional definition of "high
crimes," the metaphor of a square peg and a round hole comes to
mind. His rationale that murder by a president is an act deserving
impeachment because it indirectly "cheapens the presidency" and
"destroys his credibility with other nations," is sound, but does that
then mean it is a high crime or misdemeanor? This, in turn, raises the
question of whether it is possible that a crime may be impeachable
without being a high crime or misdemeanor.
B. The Isenbergh Thesis
In an effort to explain how such divergent understandings of im-
peachable offenses and appropriate punishments have developed from
our history and constitutional interpretation, Professor Joseph Isen-
bergh has posited that nearly everyone, including those in the broad
reading and narrow reading camps, has made a fundamental error in
concluding that impeachable offenses are defined in the Constitution
as 'Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 50
48 id.
49 GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 108.
50 See Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 15 (claiming that "[o]ne has to work quite hard against the
text to find in Article II, section 4, a definition of all impeachable offenses rather than a specifi-
cation of those offenses for which removal is mandatory upon conviction").
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According to Professor Isenbergh, this provision has long been under-
stood by proponents of both the narrow and broad reading as meaning
something that it does not say: the listed offenses are the only ones for
which a president can be impeached and removed.51 In a well-
reasoned exposition of the language and history of the Constitution
and the Framers' intent, Professor Isenbergh reinterprets the im-
peachment clauses in a manner that resolves much of the dispute re-
garding the scope of impeachable offenses.52
It is possible, he explains, that the two camps are both right and
wrong regarding the scope of impeachment. As the proponents of the
narrow reading argue, "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" are a nar-
rowly defined set of crimes against the state.53 By examining the
relevant history and the Founders' debates, Isenbergh demonstrates
that the word "high," when attached to "crime" or "misdemeanor,"
was well known to lawyers in 1787, including the Founders, as
"aiming at the state or the sovereign rather than a private person."
54
He persuasively cites Blackstone, Coke and cases dating back to the
Middle Ages to support this understanding. There is evidence that
the Framers intended the phrase to be read narrowly. In fact, as Isen-
bergh explains, the Convention originally adopted the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors against the State."5  The phrase "against
the State" was then replaced by "against the United States" to remove
"ambiguity," before being removed altogether and without explana-
tion by the Committee on Style.57 Isenbergh posits that the Commit-
tee on Style, which was not authorized to make any substantive
changes in meaning, eliminated the phrase because it was redundant
when included in the same clause with "high."58
Isenbergh's reading, and thus the narrow reading, is buttressed by
traditional canons of statutory interpretation. The words "or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors" are noseitur a sociis ("known by
their associates"). Light may be shed on the meaning of ambiguous
words by reference to the words associated with them.59 The words
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" are ejusdem generis ("of the same
kind") as treason and bribery. Therefore, in interpreting this phrase,
where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumera-
tion, the general words are construed to embrace only crimes similar
51 See id.52 See id. at 25-29.
53 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
m Id. at 20.
55 See id. at 20-22.
56 Id. at 22 (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 550 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1937)).
51 See id.
58 See id.
59 See WILLIAM FARBER & PHILIP FRCKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND CREATIE PUBLIC POLICY 637 (1995).
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in nature to those crimes enumerated by the preceding specific words.
The narrow reading of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," which only
includes offenses against the state, comports with these traditional
canons of interpretation.
While Isenbergh endorses the narrow reading of high crimes and
misdemeanors, he persuasively argues that the narrow reading propo-
nents are incorrect in their understanding that impeachable offenses
are limited to those described in Article IV, Section 2.60 By examin-
ing the plain meaning of the constitution and the relevant English and
colonial precedent, he concludes that impeachable offenses included a
wide range of offenses both criminal and non-criminal that did not
have to be directed against the state.61 Instead, those offenses di-
rected against the state require removal from office, while impeach-
able offenses arising from personal conduct, which do not harm the
state or impair its functioning in any meaningful way, may be pun-
ished at the discretion of the Senate.
Isenbergh traces the history of impeachments back to the mid-
seventeenth century to conclude that it was understood by the Found-
ers that impeachment was not limited to high crimes and misdemean-
ors. 63 In English and colonial American precedent, impeachment ex-
tended to a number of indictable and nonindictable offenses.64 Isen-
bergh cites a 1681 House of Commons resolution that Parliament had
the right to impeach "for treason or any other crime or misde-
meanor."' 5 And following a thorough historical investigation, Isen-
bergh was left to conclude that "[i]n the entire body of impeachment
cases and commentary in England impeachable offenses are not once
held out as congruent with 'high crimes and misdemeanors."' 66 The
words "high crimes and misdemeanors," Isenbergh claims, lost their
meaning over time as they began to be used as jurisdictional formali-
ties in any article of impeachment irrespective of whether high crimes
and misdemeanors were alleged.67 Thus, the words became mere in-
cantations without independent meaning.
So, if one accepts the Isenbergh thesis, that a president may be im-
peached for a wide range of offenses but that there are some offenses
for which removal is mandated, the dispute between the narrow and
broad reading camps can be abated. Article II, Section 4 refers only
60 See Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 22.
61 See id.
62See id.
6 See id.
64 See id. at 27 n.68 (referring to a number of English impeachments involving convictions
for such offenses as "frequent and notorious excesses and debaucheries," and losing a ship to
carelessness).
65Id. at 27.
66d. at 28.
67See id. at 29.
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to crimes against the state, but it does not define or in any respect
limit impeachable offenses.68 Isenbergh explains that when the Foun-
ders granted the power to impeach and set the vote standard in Article
I, Section 3, they felt no need to circumscribe an impeachable set of
offenses because impeachment had a clear meaning to them. 69 But
the narrow and the broad reading of high crimes and misdemeanors
both have support in the text and the Framers' debates, and this ques-
tion will not be resolved by historians, commentators or professors. It
is a question fundamental to the impeachment process, however, and
allowing these varying interpretations to continue could eventually
lead to a true constitutional crisis.
While it is impossible and inadvisable to attempt to circumscribe
the full ambit of impeachable offenses or "high crimes and misde-
meanors," it would be folly for Congress not to adopt a definitive an-
swer to the question of whether only offenses committed by the presi-
dent qua president or also in his private capacity could be impeach-
able.7° Amazingly, it would be debatable under the current under-
standings whether a president could be impeached for committing
rape or murder. Further, language needs to be adopted to clearly de-
termine whether impeachment is limited to high crimes and misde-
meanors or other offenses traditionally considered impeachable in the
eighteenth century. Likewise, the question of whether impeachment
is a process reserved as a method of last resort to protect the state
from abuse by its chief executive or whether civic hygiene and pre-
serving the integrity of the office are permissible constitutional ob-
jectives of impeachment needs to be resolved. These are questions
that go to the fundament of how we define our most crucial govern-
mental office, what level of accountability we require, and how much
power and latitude we grant the legislature to remove our head of
state. Common sense demands that these interpretations be reworked
and brought into consensus.
I. IS THE STANDARD THE SAME FOR ALL IMPEACHABLE OFFIcIALs?
A. The Text-It Depends on What Your Definition
of "Good Behaviour" Is
Article II, Section 4 states that "The President, Vice President and
all Civil Officers shall be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and Mis-
61 See id.
69 See id
70 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S486 (statement of White House Counsel Charles Ruff)
(maintaining that "[i]mpeachment is not a remedy for private wrongs" before the Senate during
the Clinton impeachment trial).
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demeanors."7' While it is clear that these provisions apply to judges
as well, there is much controversy about whether the Constitution
provides another higher standard of behavior for judges.72 For in-
stance, many of President Clinton's defenders attempted to minimize
the relevance of the Senate precedent regarding the removal of federal
judges by claiming that the Constitution mandates a lower standard
for judges. Charles Ruff, in his defense of the President before the
Senate, argued that the "good behaviour" phrase in the Constitution
mandates that judges be held to a higher standard than the President.74
There are two possible readings of the statement that federal
judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behavior" in Article III,
Section One." The first is that "good behavior" is an eighteenth
century term of art incorporated into the Constitution merely to ex-
plain the fact that federal judges hold tenure for life and to contrast
this with the fixed terms of the president, vice president and members
of Congress.76 The second and less historically probable reading of
the "good behavior" clause is that it establishes a higher standard by
which federal judges should be held and, consequently, a looser stan-
dard by which they might be impeached.77 This reading suggests that
"good behavior" provides a second removal standard, as well as a
second process in addition to the impeachment proceeding.78
The first reading is more widely accepted, and comports with the
Founders' notion of the independence of the judiciary, and their belief
that impeachment should be the only means by which the political
branches could remove judges. For instance, Alexander Hamilton
stated that the "article representing impeachments" in the Constitution
was the "only provision on the point which is consistent with the nec-
essary independence of the judicial character, and is the only_ one
which we find in our Constitution in respect to our own judges. ' 79
Professor Gerhardt persuasively argues that the Founders designed
the federal impeachment process to be a cumbersome, deliberate pro-
cess. Further, the notion that the Founders would devise so awkward
and politically dangerous a device for removing some federal offi-
cials, including judges, but then also include an undefined additional
7 1 U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
72 See generally, Raoul Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79
YALE L.J. 1475 (1970) [hereinafter Berger, Impeachment of Judges]; John Feerick, Impeaching
Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1970).
73 See 145 CONG. REc. S487 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of White House Counsel
Charles Ruff).
74 See id.
75 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
76 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 83.
77 See id.
78sSee id.
79 Id. (citing Ti FEDERALIST No. 79, at 474 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
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process without the procedural protections of impeachment for re-
moving judges simply defies common sense.80 Moreover, why then,
if this clearly more efficient process with its higher "good behavior"
standard exists, would the Founders have included judges in the Im-
peachment Clause?
B. Good Behavior as a Higher Standard
of Comportment for Judges
There is considerable dispute regarding the good behavior clause
and whether it establishes a higher standard of comportment for
judges. Throughout the Clinton trial, White House counsel argued
that the precedent the Senate had set in convicting and removing three
judges for offenses of a similar nature to allegations against Mr.
Clinton should not apply.8' Their argument was based on a reading of
the "during good Behaviour" clause in the Constitution as expressly
setting a higher standard of comportment for judges or a lower stan-
dard required of the president. 82 The President's Counsel argued that
even if the Senate has repeatedly determined that perjury and ob-
struction of justice are impeachable offenses warranting removal for
judges, these offenses only violate the "good behavior standard" ap-
plied to judges rather than "the impeachment standard" applied to
other federal officers.8 3
Their argument, it seems, was not based in solid constitutional
theory or history, but in their own conception of the practical impli-
cations of the conviction and removal of a sitting president. White
House counsel argued that the "standard to which judges must adhere
is stricter than the impeachment standard," and claimed that their ra-
tionale was "wholly consistent with the framers' intent in drafting the
impeachment clause" without offering any support from the Framers'
debates.84 Yet, one would expect that if the Framers had intended to
establish a lower standard of removal for judges, and possibly even a
80 See i& (explaining that along with Hamilton, the Anti-federalist essayist Brutus argued
that the "only causes" for which federal judges could be removed would be impeachable of-
fenses).
"' See 145 CONG. REc. S487 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of White House Counsel
Charles Ruff) (arguing that judges are held to a different standard than the President).
What, then, of the managers' argument that the Senate's recent conviction of three
judges requires a conviction on the articles before you today? Again, they simply
have it wrong, both as a matter of Senate precedent and as a matter of constitutional
analysis ... [because] judges are different. Indeed, every civil officer other than the
President of the United States is different. They are different because before decid-
ing whether to impose the ultimate sanction of removal the Senate must weigh in the
balance dramatically different considerations.
Id.
8 See id.
83Id. at 12.E41am
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process of removal other than impeachment, as this argument implies,
there would be some mention of it in their debates. Again, to accept
this argument we are left with the conspicuous absence of debate by
the Framers, or another "dog that did not bark." This time it relates to
an understanding of the Constitution that would significantly alter the
balance of power between the legislature and a judiciary that the
Framers by all accounts wanted to keep independent.
Much of the argument put forth by the White House counsel was
based on the notion that the Senate was able to hold judges to a
stricter standard than the President because the institutional trauma
concomitant in removing a president is so much greater than remov-
ing only "one of 900 or 1,000 judges with lifetime tenure. 85 Further,
they argued, a president can be removed by the electorate while
judges have life tenure and can only be removed by the Senate.86
Certainly, removal of a sitting president is more traumatic to the na-
tion than a single federal judge, but this argument ignores the fact that
malfeasance by a sitting president does exponentially more damage to
the nation, the rule of law, and our constitutional system than the
same offense committed by a single federal judge.87
C. Good Behavior as a Term for Life Tenure
and a Standard for Removal
Professor Isenbergh offers another interpretation of the "during
good behavior" phrase in Article III. Isenbergh believes that the
"words serve both to give judges life tenure and indicate a standard of
removal," because good behavior is a term of art meaning "to commit
no crime., 88 The difficulty of reconciling this definition of good be-
havior with the removal standard of "high crimes" in Article II is
nonexistent for Isenbergh; his reading of Article II mandates removal
for high crimes but does not preclude impeachment for bad behav-
ior.89 Thus, a judge or any other official could be impeached for bad
behavior under the traditional conception of impeachable offenses.
The real distinction to be drawn between the executive standard
versus that by which federal judges must constitutionally abide has
instead to do with the special duties and nature of the particular of-
8lam at 11.
86 see id.
87 What is perhaps most disconcerting about the manner in which Mr. Clinton handled this
scandal is the fact that his behavior was so careless and even reckless in the face of intense
public scrutiny. If he were a federal judge, the public would never have taken the time or en-
ergy required to sift through tawdriness and fecklessness repeatedly displayed in the lies under
oath, and the damage to the integrity of the office or the sanctity of the rule of law would have
been miniscule by comparison.
88 Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 31.
'9 See id at 33.
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fice. 90 For instance, a federal judge is in a peculiar position of having
to retain at least the appearance of neutrality. As a result, a particu-
larly controversial law review article or comment on the nightly news
might completely undo the public's trust in the judge's neutrality and
impugn the integrity of the office. For example, if a judge were to
state publicly that he believes "that Representative David Bonior is
the Antichrist, and that if he ever made it into his courtroom he would
make it absolutely certain that he did not walk out a winner," this
conduct would probably be impeachable. There is nothing illegal
about the statement, but it would probably be considered a "high
crime" or misdemeanor regardless, even if there was no evidence of
such behavior. In contrast, if a president stated that he considers Rep-
resentative Bonior to be worse than the Antichrist and would make
every effort to make sure that the current bills sponsored by him are
never signed into law, he could not be impeached, because neutrality
is not central to his office.
91
D. Should a President Be Judged by a Different Standard?
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan argued in September of 1998
that we resist ever removing a sitting president in the absence of the
highest form of misconduct because it might "destabilize" the Presi-
dency.92 Such risk to the Presidency is intolerable, he argues, because
the United States has become an "indispensable nation" in geopoli-
tics.93 However, a stronger argument can be made that the continua-
tion in office of a compromised and weakened president whose mo-
tives will be questioned in any action by the rest of the world, like
Mr. Clinton appears to be, does greater damage to the Presidency than
some uncertainty over who will be in office following an impeach-
ment trial.
The "indispensability" of the United States, currently sitting as the
world's lone superpower, is undoubted and has been demonstrated by
the collapse of Clinton statecraft from North Korea to Iraq during his
scandal-induced period of paralysis, which has surpassed one full
year as of this writing. The obvious weakness of the United States
during this period moved Senator Moynihan to claim that a lower
standard of behavior should be required of the president. His position
is derived from his belief that there "has to be a commander in chief.
You could very readily destabilize the presidency, move to a random-
ness. That's an institution that has to be stable, not in dispute. 94
90 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 107.
9' See id.
92 George F. Will, Shaky "Stability" Theory, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at A17.
93id.
94 id
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Columnist George F. Will explained in response to this statement
that while instability is to be feared, we can not allow the notion to
take root that for the duration of America's instability, "the Constitu-
tion's impeachment clause is a dead letter, too dangerous to act on. 95
The instability of the Office of the President needs to be guarded
against, but it might not come in the form Senator Moynihan warns.
Rather, it might result from a compromised, politically impotent
president whose guilt and damage is apparent but who nevertheless
clings to his office by shrouding himself in the protections it affords.
It is precisely the instability of this type of office holder that should
be guarded against. The nation is and must be able with uncertainty
regarding who will be holding the office in the near future; this sort of
uncertainty, or instability as Moynihan calls it, is familiar and hardly
unnerving for this republic in its maturity. As George Will points out,
"presidents are rarely-very rarely-indispensable. De Gaulle was
right. Graveyards (including, since 1970, one at Colombey-les-deux
Eglises) are full of indispensable men. 96 In fact, six of the seven
presidencies prior to Clinton's were truncated by either assassination,
scandal-induced resignation, failure to seek office or failure to win re-
election. In each case, a new president took office, and actually re-
ceived the benefit of what the pundits call a "honeymoon" with Con-
gress.
As our republic has matured, our federal government has devel-
oped such a level of stability that we tend to embrace change.97 In the
Clinton impeachment, Republicans feared the possibility of this tran-
sition politically, and roundly agreed that were Clinton to be re-
moved, Vice President Gore would put the Democrats in a much
stronger position politically for the final two years of the current ad-
ministration. Likewise, it could also have been persuasively argued
that as the charges against Mr. Clinton (and his response to them)
have caused him to be seen as ridiculous in the world's eyes, his re-
placement by a new chief executive whose integrity is undamaged
95 Id. Will went on to explain that the United States was in a much more delicate position
during the Nixon impeachment debate. Then, during the height of the Cold War, while Amer-
can troops were engaged in Southeast Asia, Congress performed its Constitutional duties by
beginning impeachment proceedings for Mr. Nixon. Sen. Moynihan's argument certainly
would have had more force during this uncertain time in our history, but the result of the im-
peachment proceedings was not "randomness," but the Ford Administration. See id.
96 id.
97 Our political system is nothing if not stable. For instance, the advantages of federal Con-
gressional incumbency are disturbing; consequently, a major push for term limits for our Con-
gressman has developed over the last decade in an effort to counter some of the entrenchment in
national office. In the last 12 elections, the lowest rates of reelection for federal House mem-
bers running as incumbents were 89% in 1974 and 91% in 1994. See Don Feder, GOP Term
Limits Just a Charade (visited March 29, 1999) <http://www.ustermlimits.org/research/105th/
charade.htm>. Interestingly, members of the House in the 1980s and 1990s were less likely to
lose their seats than members of the old Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. See id.
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would serve to greatly improve the position of the United States in
geopolitical reality.
Despite the above arguments, Moynihan's warning should be
heeded, so that the nation can avoid a situation where "a congres-
sional majority began routinely removing presidents, speakers be-
come president, no one knows who is the commander in chief, who is
the chief executive officer, and the whole stability of this nation, on
which the stability of the world rests, could be seriously and griev-
ously undermined .... ,98 This sort of situation is possible, but re-
mains regardless of which standard of impeachment we adopt. The
discretion left to Congress will always allow for the possibility of this
result. The Framers allowed this discretion but left structural con-
straints to prevent this sort of madness from overcoming the process.
First, an oath is required of the Senators who decide the president's
political fate.99 Second, a two-thirds majority is required to convict
and remove.100 Third, the Chief Justice must preside over the trial.10'
Finally, the political danger of attempting to impeach a sitting presi-
dent is enormous. During the Clinton impeachment, the Republicans,
after sitting as strongly as any point in the past fifty years, lost two
Speakers to resignation, several seats in the 1998 elections, and saw
its approval rating plummet to its lowest point since the Watergate
period of the 1970s. Consequently, the political consequences of an
impeachment proceeding are now clearer than they have ever been.
E. The Necessity of Preserving the Office
The Presidency is our most important office. 10 2 The power of the
executive branch is singularly vested in it. If the impeachment proc-
ess is abused so that an executive who is obviously corrupt is left in
office, or if a meritorious president is cast out of office for partisan
reasons, the legitimacy of the entire system of government goes with
him. The question that needs to be asked before defining the im-
peachment process is whether the Office of the President needs to be
protected more from the Senate's abuse of the impeachment power or
the President's own corrupt actions. The necessity of preserving the
Office and its unique strength is unquestioned, but how the Office can
be protected by the impeachment process needs to be defined in a
context removed from the heat of an impeachment trial.
98 George F. Will, supra note 92, at A17.
99 See U.S. CONST. art L § 3, cl. 6.
100 See id.
101 See id
102 See Arthur Selwyn Miller, Cutting the Presidency Down to Size-But Not Too Much, 43
GEo. WASH. L REv. 403,405 (1973) (explaining that "the president wears many hats-Head of
State, Chief Executive, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Legislator, Head of the Party, Tribune
of the People, Ultimate Arbiter of Social Justice, Guardian of Economic Prosperity, and World
Leader of Westeni Civilization").
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The lesson to be learned from the Clinton and Nixon impeach-
ments is the damage to the country a protracted period of uncertainty
can cause. During the thirteen-month investigation of Mr. Clinton by
the Office of the Independent Counsel ("OIC") and trial by the Sen-
ate, there was an unsettling amount of artillery exchanged between
the OIC and the executive branch.103 More importantly, the motiva-
tion behind major foreign policy actions was seriously called into
question.
One day before the Clinton impeachment proceedings were to be-
gin in the full House, Mr. Clinton ordered the bombing of Iraq.1°4
Following the first day of bombing, A.M. Rosenthal of the New York
Times wrote:
The loss in credibility [to the President] earned with his quick
decision to attack Iraq, although his impeachment was likely
the next day, will dilute the chances of lasting victory over
Saddam Hussein. He created two obstacles to eliminating
Saddam-a mountain of cynicism, and another of disbelief
.... But Mr. Clinton took the risk that his timing would cre-
ate disbelief in America and help Saddam become even more
popular in the Mideast. Palestinians in pro-Saddam ecstasy
are already burning U.S. flags they waved for the President a
few days ago. Mr. Clinton is given to strange risks-as when
he gambled the Presidency for office sex. . . . Until Mr.
Clinton ordered the attack on Iraq the day before the sched-
uled impeachment vote, his departure was a dispute about
morality, the Constitution, and politics. Now something dan-
gerous has been added: how much damage his continuation as
President does to American military and security interests,
jargon for life and death.1°5
During the two years of the Nixon impeachment fiasco, similar
problems and questions arose. In the aftermath, Hans Linde wrote
that the extended investigation and political battles had left the coun-
try at a standstill:
It is no way to conduct a government. During our recent
wallow in Watergate the nation also faced, or failed to face,
the consequences of the 1973 Middle East war, the oil crisis,
steep inflation, agricultural and other economic dislocation,
deteriorating prospects for strategic arms limitation, and
armed conflict between two NATO allies in Cyprus ....
10 3 See WILLIAM BENNETr, THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE: THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY AND THE
ASSAULT ON AMERICAN IDEALS 75 (1998) (quoting some of the harsh language and epithets
directed at Independent Counsel Starr during the investigation of President Clinton).
104 See A.M. Rosenthal, What Clinton Can Do, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1998, at A35.
105 Id.
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Worse, the time span of impeachment proceedings may pres-
ent tempting opportunities to make the duty to rally the be-
leaguered executive seem greater, as some expected the
armed forces alert called on October 25, 1973 was designed
to do. The inevitable political skepticism during such a pe-
riod, in turn, may make a genuine emergency doubly danger-
ous. Even without military undertones, it is hardly unex-
pected to find claims of presidential foreign policy indispen-
sability shamelessly thrust into the forefront of the political
crisis .... 106
Again, regardless of which position is ultimately adopted by the
Congress, there is no good reason for allowing different readings of
such a simple clause of the Constitution to exist. The Presidency is
simply too crucial of an Office to allow protracted periods of uncer-
tainty to develop. When, due to unclear standards and intragovern-
mental battling the nation is left at a de facto interregnum, the entire
world could stand imperiled. As it stands, we are unsure what stan-
dard is required of our president. Were a crisis involving some level
of executive wrongdoing to develop, the nation would need to endure
a period of uncertainty as first the facts of the allegations were devel-
oped and then the standard of required behavior was also reexamined.
Uncertainty would exist regarding whether any of our precedent in-
volving impeachment of judges or other lesser officials applies and
also whether exigent circumstances in geopolitics would militate
against removal. To remove at least some of this uncertainty, Con-
gress should adopt a uniform interpretation of these clauses and es-
tablish, at a minimum, what language describes the standard of be-
havior for our federal officials. Until this action is taken, most of the
common-law precedent developed in two hundred years of impeach-
ments is suspect.
Ill. DoEs CONVICTION MANDATE REMOVAL?
Among the most troubling aspects of the variance in interpreta-
tions is the confusion over whether the Constitution mandates re-
moval for the commission of treason, bribery, or other high crimes
and misdemeanors. The conventional wisdom is that removal is not
mandatory. 10 7 Rather, the deliberation a senator must go through ties
together conviction and removal, so that a president, though guilty of
106 Hans Linde, Replacing a President: Prescription for a 21st Century Watergate, 43 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 384, 388-89 (1975) (arguing for replacing the impeachment process with a vote
of confidence).
107 The commission of a crime against the state is not currently considered to mandate re-
moval. Instead, some secondary considerations are weighed in determining whether to convict
and remove. See, e.g., infra note 109 and accompanying text (citing Sen. Byrd); see also infra
note 149 (quoting Sen. Collins).
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high crimes and misdemeanors, will not be convicted if one-third of
the Senate does not think it would be good for the country to remove
him.0l8 Following the debate in and out of the Senate during the
Clinton impeachment, it appeared that a majority of the Clinton de-
fenders held this view, or at least seemed to support it out of political
exegesis. Senator Robert Byrd, who has achieved emeritus status for
his knowledge of Senate history and constitutional process, was the
lone senator to admit that he in fact believed that President Clinton
was guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors but that he decided to
acquit because it would be in the best interest of the country to avoid
removal and because of the rift it would cause. 109
It is difficult to determine exactly how many senators subscribed
to this view. The line the Clinton defenders put out collectively is
that their votes were either based on their belief that the crimes al-
leged against Mr. Clinton were not proven or because the crimes al-
leged did not rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors.' 11
While these views arguably are reasonable, it is unreasonable to as-
sume that nearly every Democrat in the House and Senate believed
either that Mr. Clinton was innocent or that criminal obstruction of
justice and serial perjury in federal court were not high crimes and
misdemeanors. Instead, the inescapable conclusion is that a large
percentage of Clinton's defenders in Congress agreed with Senator
Byrd. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that many of the same
Senators who voted to convict and remove Judge Walter Nixon for
the high crime of lying under oath on his taxes did not vote the same
way in the Clinton impeachment."'
The Byrd analysis runs directly counter to the Isenbergh reading of
Article II, Section 4 as mandating removal for high crimes and mis-
demeanors.1 12 The Isenbergh reading is supported by a number of
factors, both textual and prudential. As Isenbergh points out, the
word "shall" in the phrase "shall be removed" in Article II, Section 4
should be read to mean that a president's removal is mandatory if he
is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors.1 13 The word "shall," he
writes, "has imperative force everwhere in the Constitution when it
occurs in an independent clause. 1 4 Isenbergh' s reading is supported
108 See Gerhardt, Constitutional Limits, supra note 4, at 92 (arguing that the real question in
an impeachment inquiry is not simply whether a high crime was committed, but rather "the
critical question is often whether the President has the capacity, integrity, or competency to
continue to occupy the office").
109 See Robert Novak, Why Dems Blindly Backed Clinton, CHIcAGO SuN-TIMEs, Feb. 15,
1999, at A27.
110 See id.; see also Senators Offer Some Reasons for Their Decisions in Clinton's Tial,
N.Y. TIMES, supra note 9, at 3-8.
111 See Pollitt, supra note 10, at 276.
112 See Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 15 n.28.
11 See id.
1141id.
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by the fact that when the Framers meant to provide discretion in the
Constitution, they did so with a number of phrases absent in Article
II, Section 4. For instance, the word "may" is used repeatedly to vest
a power that Congress or the executive may or may not choose to use.
Likewise, the word "shall" is modified to grant discretion by either
the phrase "whenever two thirds of both Houses deem it neces-
sary,"'115 or the words "have the power to" when the Framers meant to
allow for discretion rather than creating an absolute imperative of ac-
tion as the word "shall" does when it stands alone in an independent
clause.
The language in Article I, Section 3 contains no such imperative
and creates no duty. Rather, it is a general grant of discretionary
power, with a description of the process and mandatory safeguards to
keep the power of impeachment from being used capriciously. It
provides a minimum vote standard and some limiting language re-
garding the punishments that can be meted out to the impeached.
This section clearly does not mandate that the Senate impeach those
who have committed impeachable offenses, and consequently, Sena-
tors have never felt a constitutional duty to do so. 16 This does not
affect the meaning of the impeachment language in Article II, Section
4, however, because the mandatory language there refers only to high
crimes and misdemeanors.
Beyond the text, there are prudential reasons why the impeach-
ment language in Article I, Section 2 should be read as discretionary
while Article II, section 4 should be read as mandatory. First, im-
peachment is available as a remedy for impeachable offenses, which
as a class are nearly limitless and impossible to define. Second, if
removal were required for any impeachable offense, Congress, and
especially the Senate, would be able to avoid much of the intended
political accountability that was designed to constrain the power of
the legislature's impeachment power over the executive and legisla-
tive branches. If they could identify any infraction that fell within
the broad ambit of impeachable offenses, they could then claim that
11 U.S. CONST. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution ...."). The Constitution grants Con-
gress the discretion to propose amendments or to not propose amendments; there is no impera-
tive and hence no duty to propose amendments or to convene for such purposes. Absent the
modifying "whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary" clause, Congress
would be under an affinnative duty to propose amendments at designed intervals. Thus, in
Article II, Section 3, where "shall" is not followed by the modifying "whenever two thirds shall
deem it necessary" phrase, an imperative is given to the executive requiring him to give a State
of the Union report. Likewise, in Article II, Section 2, the language grants the president discre-
tion in that "he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United
States, Except in Cases of Impeachment." Again, the president is not required to grant any
pardons, but he is given the discretion to do so.
16 See Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 14.
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the Constitution required the President's removal and no blame could
fall on them.
This is perhaps one of the most dangerous and bizarre ambiguities
in the impeachment process. The situation could arise, under our cur-
rent system, where a separate vote for conviction and removal takes
place, and some senators who voted to convict would refuse to take
part in the removal vote on the grounds that it is unconstitutional be-
cause the president has already been removed. If the removal vote
then failed, what would be the result? Would the conviction vote then
be rescinded? Common sense dictates that Congress clear up these
questions by adopting a uniform interpretation.
V. WHAT IS THE RANGE OF PUNISHMENTS FOR THE IMPEACHED?
A. The Text
Here again, there is great dispute about a relatively simple clause
of the Constitution, and there is simply no good reason for allowing it
to persist. The language of the Constitution in Article I, Section 3
states that judgement in cases of impeachment "shall not extend fur-
ther than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States."'' 7
The view of the majority of the Senate as well as the majority of
commentators is that removal and disqualification are the only pun-
ishments available to the Senate.1 8 This view has become generally
accepted, and articles of impeachment that begin in the House end
with a call that the president be convicted and removed. In the
Clinton impeachment, much of the debate about censure focused on
its use as a substitute for, rather than a punishment after, an im-
peachment and trial. Censure resolutions are viewed as extra-
constitutional, neither provided for nor prohibited by the text of the
Constitution 19 As such, it would not necessarily have the same pro-
cedural safeguards as the impeachment process, and its potential for
abusing our separation of powers causes wariness in many commen-
tators and senators.12
0
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
"'8 See, e.g., GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 78; David
Broder, Don't Hide Behind Censure, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at A17 (arguing that a
post-trial censure resolution is unconstitutional because "[o]nce the votes have been cast, the
constitutional process is over. The House and the Senate have discharged their responsibilities
.... [There is no sanction for [censure] in the Constitution, and the precedents have been terri-
ble").
119 See Broder, supra note 118, at A17 (quoting Sen. Collins and Sen. Rockefeller, both of
whom advocated a bipartisan censure resolution following the Senate trial).
o20 See id. (explaining that "[Sen.] Gramm also argued, as I have, that once censure enters
the armory of congressional punishments, the separation of powers is eviscerated...").
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No one in the Clinton trial proposed the idea that the President
could be impeached, convicted and then censured, rather than re-
moved from office. Toward the end of the trial, however, the Isen-
bergh thesis began to garner some consideration in this regard.
121
Professor Isenbergh cites the fact that the English and American co-
lonial history and precedent of impeachment up to and shortly after
1787 allowed a great range of punishments following impeachment
and conviction. These penalties ranged from "temporary suspension
from preaching" to "hanging, drawing and quartering.' 22
While the debates of the Founders do not offer much to support
this reading, they certainly offer little to foreclose its viability either.
Much of the debate is equivocal, and it is often unclear whether the
terms "high crimes" and "impeachable offenses" are being used syn-
onymously or not.l' 3 What is clear from the debates is that this issue
was not explicitly discussed one way or the other. The absence of
meaningful debate then creates a presumption that no understanding
other than the common one was developed or intended. As this issue
appears to be a "dog that did not bark" in the Founders' debates, the
natural assumption is that there was no intent to break from relevant
history and practice to limit the range of punishments for impeach-
ment to only removal and disqualification.
Moreover, this understanding is reflected in the text; Isenbergh ar-
gues that if the Founders had intended to limit punishments only to
removal and disqualification they would have used the word "only,"
as they did elsewhere.1 24 He cites Article III, Section 3 where the
Founders wrote that treason against the United States "shall consist
only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies,
giving Them Aid and Comfort."'5
To further support his argument, Prof. Isenbergh examines the im-
peachment and trial of Justice John Pickering in 1804.126 Pickering
was impeached for drunkenness. 27 When the trial came down to a
vote on Pickering's guilt, the Senate decided to have separate votes.
121 On January 29, 1999, Douglas W. Kmiec, a professor of constitutional law at Pepperdine
University, published an article in the Wall Street Journal where he endorsed the Isenbergh
view that Article , Section 3 of the Constitution allows for a lesser penalty upon conviction of
impeachable offenses other than high crimes and misdemeanors. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Con-
vict, but Don't Remove Clinton, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1999, at A21. This view was similarly
endorsed by Stuart Taylor, Jr. See Conviction Need Not Mean Removal, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25,
1999, at 15. Mr. Taylor endorsed and defended the Isenbergh view of the range of punishments
for impeachment and conviction. See id. at 15.
12 Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 17 n.35.
12 See generally THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 50-65
(Max Farrand ed., 1937).
124 Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 17 n.35.
2 U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 3, cl. 1.
126 See Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 41-43.
127 see u
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The first involved Pickering's guilt, where he was convicted by a vote
of nineteen to seven. 128 In the second vote, the senate voted to re-
move Pickering by a twenty to six vote.129 If no lesser sanction than
removal were available to the senators, Isenbergh argues, this second
vote would have been unnecessary. 130
Isenbergh cites the Pickering impeachment and removal as con-
firming his theory that lesser penalties are available to the Senators. 131
Likewise, his reading of the mandatory nature of Article, Section 4
and its restriction to high crimes and misdemeanors is also sup-
ported. 132 Because Pickering had been charged with drunkenness,
which is not a high crime, his removal upon conviction was not man-
datory but had to be decided by a separate vote.
The impeachment proceedings involving Senator William Blount
in 1797 are enlightening regarding the purpose of impeachment and
the intended range of punishments. 33 Senator Blount was expelled
by the Senate for "having been guilty of a high misdemeanor, entirely
inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator."' 134
The Senate expelled Blount on these charges, but the House sub-
sequently decided to impeach nonetheless.'13 This action by the
House, especially considering its proximity to the framing debates
and ratification of the Constitution, is revealing regarding the purpose
of impeachment. If it were simply a method of "last resort" to protect
those officials who might cause "grave danger to the Nation" as the
narrow reading proponents suggest, this action by the House would
seem to be mere surplusage and possibly unconstitutional. 136 If im-
peachment was only to function as a removal proceeding for danger-
ous officials, what would have been the point of impeaching Senator
Blount after he had been removed from office? Similarly, in 1876,
the House unanimously impeached Secretary of War Belknap after he
had resigned from office.' 37 These early actions by the House also
support the notion that impeachment could have been designed as a
method of civic hygiene. The Blount and Belknap impeachments
were probably intended to provide a formal action to express the
House's disapproval of these federal officials' actions. Consequently,
'2 See id at42.
129 See id
130 See id
131 See id at 43.
132 See id
133 See Rotunda, supra note 4, at 717 (explaining that President Washington appointed
Senator Blount of Tennessee to be Superintendent of Indian Affairs. Blount schemed to organ-
ize the Cherokee and Creek Indians to help Great Britain oust the Spanish from Florida and
Louisiana).
134Id
"133See id.
136 See supra text accompanying note 8.
137 See Pollitt, supra note 10, at 272.
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the notion that the Framers may have allowed for a more expansive
range of lesser penalties, rather than only removal and disqualifica-
tion, is supported.
Further, Alexander Hamilton's argument regarding where the im-
peachment power should be vested supports this broader notion of
impeachment as a means to formalize disapproval and social oppro-
brium of a federal official's actions. 138 In Federalist 65, Hamilton
made reference to the "awful discretion which a court of impeach-
ments must necessarily have to doom to honor or to infamy the most
confidential and most distinguished characters of the community
.... ,139 Hamilton's references here to "honor" and "infamy" as the
consequences of impeachments of "distinguished characters" further
reinforces the notion that the Founders may have intended for the
range of punishments for impeachment to include sanctions of a
lesser variety, rather than only removal.
Support for this argument can also be found in the words of Ben-
jamin Franklin on the purpose and virtue of the impeachment process:
What was the practice before this in cases where the chief
Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why recourse was
had to assassination in [which] he was not only deprived of
his life but of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It
[would] be the best way therefore to provide in the Constitu-
tion for the regular punishment of the Executive when his
conduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal
when he should be unjustly accused.1'4
Again, if the Founders understood impeachment to involve only re-
moval from office, one would expect that the language would be con-
fined to balance of power issues and the potential for a crisis of le-
gitimacy. Instead, Franklin appears concerned about impeachment on
a much smaller scale, and particularly whether it affords an executive
a fair opportunity of "vindicating his character."141 Further, it is de-
scribed as a method to provide "the regular punishment of the Execu-
tive when his conduct should deserve it."14 It is difficult to square
this language with the notion that impeachment is a mechanism "of
last resort" to be used only where the continuance of an executive in
office would cause "grave danger to the Nation.'
143
"
3
" See THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
139 ld.
140 THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65 (Max Fan-and ed.,
1937).
141 Id.
142 id
'43 145 CONG. REC. S486 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999) (statement of white House Counsel
Charles Ruff).
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Strangely, Isenbergh's argument, which seems solidly based in
history and a reasonable reading of the plain meaning of the text, has
been dismissed out of hand by commentators and Senators alike.
Much of the criticism it has received appears to be based more in the
notion that it is novel rather than wrongheaded. For instance, Robert
H. Bork stated that "[o]ne is entitled to be suspicious of a constitu-
tional interpretation that nobody thought of for over 200 years."'
144
Bork's main objection to the Isenbergh thesis is that he believes it
"necessarily produces a conflict" between the impeachemnt language
in Article I, Section 3 and Article II, Section 4, and thus "gratuitously
charges the Founders with sloppy draftsmanship."' 145 On the contrary,
Isenbergh's reading does no such thing. Rather, it alleges that the
impeachment articles are relating to different things. Article I is a
general grant of power that provides some structural safeguards and a
limit on punishments. 146  Article II mandates removal for high
crimes.1
47
Bork further turns the "dog that did not bark" argument on its head
by alleging that "if there were anything to [the Isenbergh thesis] it
should have been mentioned in the history of the founding.,,' 48 To the
contrary, Isenbergh's thesis is consistent with the history and prece-
dent that surrounded and defined the impeachment process contempo-
raneous to the drafting of the Constitution. Therefore, if the Founders
had meant to depart from, rather than incorporate, the contemporane-
ous colonial and English understanding of impeachment, one would
expect there to be express language in the debates reflecting such a
shift in understanding. Consequently, this "dog that did not bark'
leads to the reasonable understanding that impeachable offenses are
not defined in the Constitution.
A finding of fact was proposed with a separate vote apart from the
decision of whether to remove by Senator Collins of Maine. 49 While
this was consistent with the Isenbergh thesis and had occurred before
in the trial of Justice Pickering,'50 it was criticized by many as an un-
constitutional punishment of the President. Robert Bork argues that
the one of the most troubling effects of the Isenbergh thesis "would
be to say that a president of the United States is convicted as a felon
by the Senate but is nevertheless worthy to be president."' 51 This is a
strange criticism in a number of respects. First, every reading of the
'44 Robert Bork, Read the Constitution: It's Removal or Nothing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 1999,
at A21.
145 Id.
146 See Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 15.
147 See id.
148 id.
149 See Broder, supra note 118, at AI7.
150 See Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 41-43.
'5' Bork, supra note 144, at A21.
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impeachment process allows for such a belief to be held; no one, in-
cluding Bork, believes that all impeachable offenses are indictable or
felonious, 152 nor that all felonies are impeachable. Second, a finding
of fact does not necessarily fall within the description of a punish-
ment, and it is a tenuous argument to claim that it would be pro-
scribed as such by the Constitution.
Consistent With the other interpretations, including Bork's, the Is-
enbergh thesis would allow the result Bork declares anomalous
above, but only where the felony is of a private nature that falls short
of high crimes and misdemeanors.153 In contrast, it is the conven-
tional view that allows a president who all know to be a felon and
even guilty of a high crime such as treason to remain in office if the
Senate believes that it is in the best interest of the country. Thus, un-
der the conventional view, it is not only possible that an executive
guilty of treason remains in office, but even more dangerously, his
actions would receive the Senate's formal imprimatur and exonera-
tion in an acquittal vote.' 54 The idea that the Founders would allow
for a traitorous president to remain in office is difficult to accept.
B. Censure
The proponents of censure argue that it provides a needed alterna-
tive to removal. Its critics argue that under our system of separation
of powers, the role of the Senate is not to punish the president, but to
remove him if necessary to protect the republic. 155  In considering
these arguments, one must remember that the fundamental object of
impeachment is to maintain the supremacy of the law against the mis-
conduct of public officials. It came into existence in order to investi-
gate and prosecute the highest ranking members of the federal gov-
ernment, who are otherwise beyond the reach of judicial process. The
Senate, without less drastic alternatives like censure, is left only with
alternatives of removal, which means overturning an election, or ac-
quittal, which amounts to a Senate imprimatur of the president's be-
havior. This will often amount to the Senate sending the wrong mes-
sage to the public. If the Clinton situation were to have occurred just
152 See id.
153 See Isenbergh, supra note 3, at 16.
154 See White House Associate Counsel Dmitri Nionakis, Address at the Case western
School of Law (Mar. 16, 1999) (explaining that "even if, hypothetically, the President were to
be guilty of selling secrets to the Chinese," the Senate would not need to convict and remove
automatically, but would have to consider the effects of his removal on the common weal and
how much damage this single act of treason caused the country before voting to convict or ac-
quit).
155 See, e.g., text accompanying note 8 (quoting White House Counsel Charles Ruff's
statement that impeachment "is not a punishment for private wrongs"); see also Bork, supra
note 144, at A21 (explaining that the "Senate may not attach additional penalties; removal and
disqualification are all the Senate may decree").
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prior to an election, the President would be able to hold up his ac-
quittal, claim complete innocence, and chastise his accusers, even if
he were guilty of reprehensible and illegal behavior.
The argument that allowing censure would create a situation
where the Senate is constantly criticizing the president and abusing
the separation of powers envisioned by the Founders is a suspect
one. 15 - The notion that the Founders, following a colonial experience
where they were without real representation and forced to accept the
dictates of a king, would not allow their elected representatives to
express formal disapproval of their executive's actions is difficult to
accept. Further, the idea that an "acquittal" decision may be rendered
when the Senate believes the president guilty of an impeachable of-
fense or perhaps even a high crime does great damage to the principle
that the law applies to all equally. In a similar vein, the argument that
providing censure as an alternative punishment will create a situation
where presidents or Supreme Court justices will be censured on a
weekly basis is laughable. First, censure would only follow an im-
peachment, with all of its structural and political protections. Second,
two-thirds of the Senate is required to impeach and censure, and an
ill-intentioned faction within the Senate of such numbers essentially
will be able to enact its legislative agenda without regard to the presi-
dent's wishes. Therefore, if this faction wished to waste its time
drafting and debating censure resolutions, that should be the least of
our republic's worries.
V. WHAT STANDARD OF PROOF AND DuE PRocEss DOEs THE
CONSTITUTION REQUIRE?
The Framers, in their wisdom, left open the questions of what due
process was required in an impeachment trial as well as what standard
of proof is required to convict. The Senate has repeatedly refused to
apply a uniform standard of proof to impeachment trials.15 7 Senators
choose, as they did in the Clinton impeachment, from standards of
proof as low as "a common sense" standard to a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard.158 Those senators requiring a "beyond a reasonable
15 6 See Broder, supra note 118, at A17.
157 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 41 (describing the
Judge Claiborne trial where the Senate refused to adopt the "beyond a reasonable doubt" stan-
dard by a 75 to 15 vote). Subsequently, the Trial Committees for Judges Hastings and Nixon
both construed that vote as precedent confirming that the standard of proof was left to each
senator's discretion. See id at 42.
158 Following the Clinton impeachment trial, a number of senators went on record explain-
ing the standard they employed in reaching their decisions. See Senators Offer Some Reasons
for Their Decisions in Clinton's Trial, supra note 9. The standards adopted by the senators
individually varied widely. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was adopted by a major-
ity of Democrats, but many Republicans also. Other standards were defended as well. For
instance, Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana explained his acquittal vote by the standard that the
"case must be overwhelming. Here, it is not." Id. Another further confusing standard was
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doubt" standard do so because they believe it makes conviction more
difficult, thereby providing more protection to the other branches of
government. 159 Other senators favor the same standard because they
believe that "fairness dictates" that a defendant accused of a crime
deserves the same high standard as an accused felon in a criminal
court.
160
Some maintain that the proper standard of proof should be some-
thing lower, such as clear and convincing evidence. 161 They criticize
the "beyond the reasonable doubt" standard as failing to recognize the
true purpose of impeachment, which is to protect the public from the
recklessness or malice of an unfit officer. 162 A standard below "clear
and convincing" such as a "preponderance of the evidence" has also
been criticized because it "fails to respect society's interest in retain-
adopted by Senator John Edwards, Democrat of North Carolina, who described what he consid-
ered the "one quintessential moment of the trial":
The question was, Is [sic] this a matter about which reasonable people can differ? I
will never forget Manager Lindsey Graham coming to the microphone and his an-
swer was "Absolutely." Now if the prosecution concedes that reasonable people can
differ about this, how can we not have reasonable doubt.[sic]
Id. Manager Graham was not expressing the opinion that reasonable people can disagree about
whether Mr. Clinton had committed the crimes alleged; in fact, he considered Mr. Clinton's
guilt indisputable. The question to which Sen. Edwards refers was about whether the offenses,
if proven as Rep. Graham believed they were, rose to the level of high crimes as envisioned by
the Founders. Rep. Graham acknowledged that reasonable people could differ in that respect,
but he was not stating that the facts of the case did not establish Mr. Clinton's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See id. Senator Judd Gregg, Republican of New Hampshire, stated that the
President's crimes had "been fairly proven," and voted to convict. Id. Senator Barbara Mikul-
ski, Democrat of Maryland, stated that she voted to acquit because "the House managers' case
was thin and circumstantial" and "did not present sufficient direct evidence to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt" that the President had committed crimes. Id. Senator Pat Roberts, Republican
of Kansas, voted to convict Mr. Clinton on a "Kansas common sense" standard. He stated that
"an open-minded individual applying Kansas common sense would reach the conclusion that I
reached." Id. Senator Richard Shelby, Republican of Alabama, stated that he voted to convict
because the "House managers proved beyond a reasonable doubt" that the President had ob-
structed justice but not that he had peijured himself. Id. Minority Leader Daschle voted to ac-
quit on the basis that the allegations had not been proven "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
Senator Susan Collins, Republican of Maine, stated that
If I were a juror in an ordinary criminal case, I might very well vote to convict faced
with these facts. Nevertheless, I do not think that the President's actions constitute a
high crime or misdemeanor.... I will cast my vote not for the current president, but
for the presidency. I believe that in order to convict, we must conclude from the evi-
dence presented to us with no room for doubt that our Constitution will be injured
and our democracy suffer should the president remain in office one moment more.
In this instance, the claims failed to reach this very high standard.
Id. *
IS9 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 42.
16 Id. (quoting Sen. Orrin Hatch: "fairness dictates the Senate use the same standard" as a
criminal court). ,
161 See Rotunda, supra note 4, at 719 (arguing that the "seriousness and uniqueness of im-
peachment caution that it should not be used too readily or too easily accomplished. The stan-
dard of proof should be a high one, such as 'clear and convincing evidence'-the standard used
in important, noncriminal cases").
'62 See U
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ing skilled and honest government officials and the damage to the
innocent jurist's reputation wrought by an erroneous conviction."1 63
Yet, in light of the fact that the Senate's range of penalties extend
only to removal and disqualification rather than deprivation of life,
liberty or property as in a criminal trial, a lower standard like a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" might be appropriate.
Many have called for the Senate to establish a uniform standard of
proof.'6 However, leaving the standard of proof to each senator's
discretion allows for the standard to be chosen that is appropriate to
the allegation. No uniform standard of proof or complete notion of
due process has or should be adopted because, in certain circum-
stances, time may be of the essence in an impeachment inquiry. For
instance, a president may be faced with credible allegations of a seri-
ous high crime like treason. Naturally, he might refuse to provide any
exculpatory information and begin to use Nixonian or Clintonian tac-
tics of stonewalling, raising spurious claims of executive privilege,
and sending his aides out to lie for him. In order to protect the repub-
lic, it may be necessary to remove him immediately. In such a situa-
tion, senators' views that the same due process and standard of proof
of a criminal trial should be used in the impeachment process would
clearly be unwise. Applying a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
in this situation would present the following problems. First, it would
require an independent counsel or special prosecutor to amass a
mountain of evidence over a protracted period of time. Second, it
would require a lengthy trial with opportunity to rebut this evidence,
as well as witnesses and all the other time-consuming aspects atten-
dant to a trial. In a situation where a president appears to be a danger
to the republic, many of the procedural and structural protections of a
formal trial, by necessity, may be ignored.
But when the nature of charges are markedly different, due proc-
ess similar to a criminal court and a higher standard of proof, such as
"beyond a reasonable doubt," would be appropriate. For instance,
where a president is charged with illegal activity related to his private
life, the reason behind the impeachment is based more in holding the
president responsible to the same laws as the rest of us. As such,
most, if not all, of the procedural protections and a heightened stan-
dard of proof should be applied. This would give the president and
the country some protection from baseless charges related to his per-
sonal life, as too low a standard would invite spurious allegations and
put senators in a very difficult position. To accommodate these very
163 Id.
164 See GERHARDT, FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 1, at 40-41 (explaining
that the "major argument in favor of a uniform burden of proof is that it would put both sides in
an impeachment trial on notice as to how best to present their respective cases and would allow
for greater consistency in impeachment trials").
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different situations, the standard of proof and precise outlines of due
process need to be left to the discretion of each senator.
The danger in all this is not in senators abusing a process without
bright line rules, but in some senators or perhaps a president believing
that an executive must be given the same standard of proof and due
process as is required under the Constitution for criminal trials. If one
believes that most or all of these criminal standards are mandatory,
then the situation could arise when an official is investigated in an
extremely expeditious manner after a "smoking gun," for instance,
appears. In such a situation, the Senate may feel it absolutely neces-
sary to remove the official immediately without much of a formal
process. If some senators, or perhaps the president, believe that the
Senate's conviction and removal actions were in violation of consti-
tutional due process requirements, a real constitutional crisis, where a
president refuses to acknowledge the validity of a Senate removal
vote, could occur. This possibility can not be avoided entirely, of
course, but adopting clear standards, or where appropriate, expressly
validating the absence of a clear standard, could remove some uncer-
tainty surrounding this most important process.
VI. THE CONFUSION AND THE PossmirrY OF A REAL
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
The American impeachment process is a delicate balancing act
between attempting to rein in the grant to Congress of the "awful dis-
cretion' 165 to which Hamilton referred, with the real politik concerns
of the government's ability to protect itself from the corrupt abuses of
an executive in power.166 The impeachment language in the Consti-
tution and the Framers' debates are open to a number of valid inter-
pretations. It is not the intent of this Comment to establish how these
issues are resolved; rather, it is only a recommendation that Congress
adopt some uniformity of interpretation regarding several key issues.
Among the list of impeachable offenses described by James Madi-
son included "the wanton removal of meritorious officers," which
would subject a President "to impeachment and removal."'167 Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson was impeached and came within one vote in the
Senate of conviction for removing a "meritorious" member of his
Cabinet. 168 It is equally clear that refusing to remove an officer who
is guilty of a serious and continuing offense against the state, like
treason for instance, would warrant impeachment. In light of these
competing duties, it is easy to see how one group within Congress
16 THE FEDERALisT NO. 65, at 396 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
166See u
167 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 517 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
16 See Pollitt, supra note 10, at 277-78 (1998).
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could feel duty bound by their oath and fealty to the Constitution to
impeach and remove a president, while another group could view the
removal attempts as an unconstitutional and therefore illegitimate
coup d'etat-an action itself warranting impeachment.
Democratic government depends on the legitimacy of its process.
The impeachment process in particular needs to be well defined, be-
cause it is inherently political and belongs to the legislature alone.
The power of impeachment is without any check or balance, and is
not subject to judicial review. Congress must not allow this power to
appear to be arbitrary. The fact that the Constitution does vest a great
deal of discretion in Congress and that final authority does lie in the
Senate, does not mean that Congress's power is arbitrary or has no
limits to its legitimacy. As the Texas Supreme Court has described its
own state impeachment procedures:
There is a vast difference between arbitrary power and final
authority. This court, in most cases has final authority; but it
has, and can exercise, no arbitrary power. So the Senate, sit-
ting as a court of impeachment, has, and in the nature of
things should have final authority but it, too, is wholly lack-
ing in arbitrary power.
169
If the widely varying interpretations of the purpose, scope and
mechanisms of the impeachment process discussed in this Comment
are allowed to continue, it is only a matter of time before the removal
actions of the Senate will be seen as the illegitimate exercise of arbi-
trary power. With the stakes so high, it is deeply troubling that we
allow these major differences in interpretation to persist. This process
is among the most important that our constitutional system both pro-
vides and depends upon, and it is imperative that Congress act to es-
tablish some uniformity of interpretation. The purpose of this Com-
ment is not to suggest that these clarifications will, ipso facto, elimi-
nate the potential for a crisis over the legitimacy of an impeachment.
What is suggested here is not a panacea, but merely a logical neces-
sity.
MARK R. SLUSARt
169 Ferguson v. Maddox, 263 S.W. 888, 892 (Tex. 1924), quoted in Rotunda, supra note 4,
at 727.
t The author would like to thank his father, Robert J. Slusar, for supporting his prodigal son.
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